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Thursday, July 23, 2020 | History

2 edition of Comment on Gilbert and Newberrys Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly found in the catalog.

Comment on Gilbert and Newberrys Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly

Stephen W. Salant

Comment on Gilbert and Newberrys Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly

by Stephen W. Salant

  • 236 Want to read
  • 26 Currently reading

Published by Rand in Santa Monica, Calif .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Patents -- Economic aspects.

  • Edition Notes

    Bibliography: p. 8.

    StatementStephen W. Salant.
    SeriesRand paper series -- P-6840
    The Physical Object
    Pagination8 p. ;
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL16501725M

    Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment pp. Richard Gilbert and David M G Newberry Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Reply pp. Jennifer Reinganum Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment pp. . In an influential article, Gilbert and Newbery [I argued that an incumbent monopolist has a strong incentive for preemptive patenting. They couched their formal argument in a complete-information bidding model of R&D competition. Whichever firm bids the most for R&D services pays the second price and wins a patent for a new technology.

    to "paper patents"); Richard J. Gilbert & David M. G. Newberry, Preemptive Patent- ingandthe Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. , () ("A sleep- ing patent is an invention that is not put to commercial use."). Gilbert, Richard., David, Newberry., Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review. 72(3) Google Scholar; Kumar, R., Comments. Login options. Check if you have access through your login credentials or your .

    "Comment on Gilbert and Newbery's 'Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly,'" American Economic Review, March l "A Misguided Energy Program: Reshaping OECD's Oil-Sharing Plan" (with R. Smith), New York Times, Sunday Forum, November 4, l Supporting editorial appeared in New York Times, November l6, l Gilbert RJ, Newbery DMG () Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly power. Amer. Econom. Rev. – Google Scholar; Glen J, Lee K, Singh A () Corporate profitability and the dynamics of competition in emerging markets: A time series analysis. Econom. J. – Google Scholar; Goldfarb A () Why the Schlitz.


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Comment on Gilbert and Newberrys Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly by Stephen W. Salant Download PDF EPUB FB2

Comment on Gilbert and Newberry's "Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly". Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, (OCoLC) Document Type: Book: All Authors / Contributors: Stephen W Salant.

Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly Power Article (PDF Available) in American Economic Review 72(3) February with 2, Reads How we measure 'reads'.

A recent article by Richard Gilbert and David Newbery advances the thesis that, even in the absence of market failures, the patent system provides incentives for a monopolist who is inefficient at R&D to outspend more efficient potential rivals so as to win the race to the patent office.

Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly By RICHARD J. GILBERT AND DAVID M. NEWBERY* The problem of dominant firms has re-ceived much attention in the antitrust litera-ture.

One strand of thought, exemplified by George Stigler, argues that the forces of nat-ural selection are strong and that firms which. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment Article (PDF Available) in American Economic Review 74(1) February with Reads How we measure 'reads'.

Gilbert and D. Newberry, “Pre-emptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly,” American Economic Review, 72 (3), pp.has been cited by the following article: TITLE: Innovation in the Financial Sector: Persistence and Schumpeterian Hypotheses. AUTHORS: Roberto Napoli.

Gans, Joshua, & Stern, Scott,"Incumbency and R&D incentives: licensing the gale of creative distruction," Working papers WPMassachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of e Chun & Sung-Bae Mun, "Innovative Activities of an Incumbent and a Potential Entrant: An Empirical Exploration of the Role of Uncertainty in Product and.

Gilbert, Richard J & Newberry, David M G, "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association. If the incumbent and the entrant bid for a stochastic R&D technology in an auction framework as in Gilbert andPreemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly, American Economic Rev Gilbert, R.J.

and D.M.G. Newbery,Uncertain innovation and the persistence of monopoly: Comment, American Economic Review (), Richard J. Gilbert and David M. Newbery show that, because an incumbent firm enjoys greater marginal incentives to engage in R&D (under their assumption of deterministic invention), the incumbent firm will engage in preemptive patenting.

Thus the industry will tend to remain monopolized, and by the same firm. Gilbert, R. and Newbery, D. (), “ Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly,” The American Economic Rev – Gilson, R. (), “ The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Routeand Covenants not to Compete,” New York University Law Rev –   Gilbert R.

J., Newberry D. Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly. American Economic Review, – Google Scholar; Other useful comments have come from Jane Dutton, Kathy Eisenhardt, Ranjay Gulati, Nicolaj Siggelkow, Mary Tripsas, and three anonymous AMJ reviewers.

This study analyzes the impact of patent policy change on a two-way relationship between innovation and monopoly power by utilizing firm-level panel data of high and medium technology firms over – Findings suggest that there is a nonlinear impact (inverted U-shaped) of monopoly power on patenting in the post-TRIPs regime.

Part I Persistence 1. Richard J. Gilbert and David M.G. Newbery (), ‘Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly’ 2. Jennifer F. Reinganum (), ‘Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly’ 3. Richard J. Gilbert and David M.G. Newbery (), ‘Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment’ 4.

Abstract. This chapter examines the paradox of financial innovations and innovators in the US and abroad over the last two decades.

The ’s and ’s saw a flurry of new financial products and services despite such innovations being costly to develop by pioneers and easy to imitate by rivals. We investigate the relationship between market concentration and industry innovative effort within a familiar two-stage model of R&D race in which fi rms compete à la Cournot in the product market.

With the help of numerical simulations, we show that such a setting is rich enough to generate Arrovian, Schumpeterian and inverted-U curves. We interpret these different patterns on the basis of. Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly Power: Richard J.

Gilbert (University of California-Berkeley) and David M. Newberry (Cambridge University). Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Jennifer F. Reinganum (Vanderbilt University). The Learning Curve, Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing: Luis M. We study incentives for innovations that enable firms to enter backward into the input market.

Such innovations are disruptive in that they lead to structural changes and even reversal of supply-customer relationships. We first show that Arrow's replacement effect is also present in our vertical setting which gives rise to two general results: (1) vertical integration lowers the R&D incentive.

Gilbert, R.J. and Newbery, D.M. () ‘Pre-emptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly’, ch 21, pp in J.M. Alec Gee and G. Norman (eds) Market Strategy and Structure, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf ISBNreprinted from American Economic Review,72.

Gilbert and Newberry () have argued that the monopolist always preempts the entrant and adopts a new technology just before it becomes profitable for the entrant to do so. Reinganum () has shown that this preemptive outcome depends critically on the monopolist knowing precisely when the entrant intends to adopt.

As assignments, students will be asked to post comments to two blog articles of their choice (see below). (). Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly.

American Economic Review – • Gilbert, R. and Newbery, D. (). Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. American Economic Review Salant, Stephen, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment, 74 Am.

Econ. Rev. () F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (2d ed. ) F. M. Scherer et al., Patents and the Corporation: A Report on Industrial Technology Under Changing Public Policy (2d ed.

).Gilbert, R. and Newberry, D. (): Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly. The American Economic Review 72(3), Lerner, J. (): An empirical exploration of a technology race. RAND Journal of Economics 28(2), Loury, G. .